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Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on 
Citizen Assessment of Policy Outcomes  
 
Scott S. Boddery—Gettysburg College 
Laura P. Moyer—University of Louisville 
Jeff Yates—Binghamton University  
 
The manner in which political institutions convey their policy outcomes can have important 
implications for how the public views institutions’ policy decisions. This paper explores whether 
the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court communicates its policy decrees affects how favorably 
members of the public assess its decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether attributing a 
decision to the nation’s High Court or to an individual justice influences the public’s agreement 
with the Court’s rulings. Using an experimental design, we find that when a U.S. Supreme Court 
outcome is ascribed to the institution as a whole, rather than to a particular justice, people are more 
apt to agree with the policy decision. We also find that identifying the gender of the opinion author 
affects public agreement under certain conditions. Our findings have important implications for 
how public support for institutional policy-making operates, as well as the dynamics of how the 
Supreme Court manages to accumulate and maintain public good-will.  
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their helpful critiques on earlier drafts of this article. Please direct all correspondence to Scott 
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The manner in which institutions convey policy choices to the rest of the world has long interested 
students of politics and public policy and represents a core concern of governance dynamics (e.g., 
Easton 1965; Mondak 1992; Druckman 2001; Estlund 2007). In the case of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the American convention of attributing court decisions to justices in signed opinions 
involves a careful balancing of important and sometimes competing concerns, including judicial 
independence, accountability, and how the opinions will be perceived by external political actors 
and the public. Legal scholars have advanced strong opinions on whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
approach to transmitting its case decisions is optimal or might be better handled in another manner. 
Fiss (1983) argues that the current method of individually signed majority opinions best serves the 
Court’s institutional legitimacy while also promoting justices’ accountability for their decisions. 
On the other hand, some suggest that the Court’s institutional credibility and robustness would be 
better served through the use of anonymous opinions—similar to the practice employed in civil 
law countries (Markham 2006; Bozzo 2015).   
In this paper, we address a puzzle that persists regarding how the U.S. High Court fosters 
and preserves legitimacy and support among the public: can the manner in which the Court 
communicates its policy decrees affect whether members of the public react favorably to its legal 
decisions? Specifically, we are interested in whether citizens’ agreement with a decision by the 
Court is affected by source cues tied to the identity of the majority opinion author. We argue that 
majority opinions attributed to the U.S. Supreme Court as a whole should enjoy higher levels of 
agreement than those attributed to particular justices because the Court-attributed opinions will 
connote neutrality, credibility, and institutional legitimacy (Hoekstra 1995; Bartels & Mutz 2009; 
Gibson et al. 2014). 
Using an experimental design with approximately 1200 respondents, we find support for 
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our primary thesis that legal decisions attributed to the U.S. Supreme Court—as opposed to a 
specific justice—enjoy higher levels of agreement. Our results also confirm that this relationship 
is conditioned on citizens’ ideological identity. In extended analyses, we find that environmental 
cultural influences help determine whether and how the gender of the attributed justice has an 
impact on citizen agreement with U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
For the U.S. Supreme Court, these considerations are especially significant given that the 
Court lacks the means possessed by Congress or the executive to enforce and implement its 
judgments. The Court is an unusually vulnerable policy making institution that relies on public 
support to maintain its policy viability and protect it from institutional encroachment (e.g., 
Caldeira 1986). As Gibson (2012, 2015) and others have noted, “legitimacy is for losers.” In other 
words, a person’s assessment of the legitimacy of an institution and the legitimacy of its policy 
decisions quite often turns on whether they agree with them. The U.S. Supreme Court typically 
only has to draw from its “reservoir of good will” when citizens disagree with its verdicts. Hence, 
making policy decisions in a manner that is more palatable to a wider portion of the public, all else 
being equal, goes a long way toward an institution being able to maintain long-term diffuse support 
from the public (i.e., legitimacy) and enjoy its governing benefits (2015:82-84). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical framework for 
understanding agreement with U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and Section 3 describes our 
experimental design. In Section 4, we discuss the results from our main models and then in Section 
5 test whether our findings on justice attribution are affected by the gender of the opinion author.  
In the final section of our paper we discuss the implications of our findings for American politics 
and legal policy making and suggest potential paths for future research on this subject. 
Theoretical Framework 
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Agreement and Supreme Court Decisions 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court is dependent on public support to maintain its legitimacy and to 
ensure the implementation of its rulings, scholars have focused a great deal of their attention on its 
public perception (Gibson & Caldeira 1992; Scheb & Lyons 2000; Gibson et al. 2003). Notable in 
this literature is the conclusion that the American High Court benefits from a robust sense of 
legitimacy not enjoyed by other high courts (Gibson et al. 1998) and that this diffuse support does 
not turn on affection for its decisions (Gibson & Caldeira 2009). In recent years, others have argued 
that assessments of legitimacy are at least in part a function of ideological agreement with the 
Court, with the implication being that the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy may not be so stable 
after all (Christenson & Glick 2015; Bartels & Johnston 2013, but see Gibson & Nelson 2015). 
Central to this debate is the question of how the public actually processes output from the Court 
(Johnston et al. 2014). Given that legitimacy is most important for those who do not agree with 
the Court’s decisions (Gibson 2012; Gibson et al. 2014) and can impact implementation (Canon 
& Johnson 1984), it becomes important to understand what factors influence public agreement 
with the specific decisions of the Court. 
 While considerably less attention has been paid to studying citizens’ agreement with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions than citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of such decisions, the 
existing research points to the importance of the content of Court opinions (Zink et al. 2009; Baas 
& Thomas 1984; Mondak 1994), as well as attributes of the Court (Boddery & Yates 2014; Zink 
et al. 2009) and the framing of the decision by the media (Zilis 2015; Mondak 1994). One 
especially promising avenue for unpacking agreement dynamics focuses on the use of source cues 
as heuristics in public opinion about the U.S. Supreme Court. Because U.S. Supreme Court rulings 
are often complicated and can be difficult for a lay person or even journalists (Slotnick & Segal 
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1994) to understand easily, relying on heuristics can ease the cognitive burden for those trying to 
understand and evaluate the Court’s decision in a case. Such heuristic cue-following allows people 
to make quick assessments on complex matters in order to help make sense of the world around 
them in an efficient and largely effective manner (e.g., Kahneman 2011; Nicholson & Hansford 
2014; Salamone 2014). In experimental settings, researchers have found that the public is 
responsive to partisan source cues about the Court (Nicholson & Hansford 2014; Clark & Kastellec 
2015) and that the ideology of the opinion author in particular serves as a source cue that conditions 
individual agreement with court decisions—even those that run counter to an individual’s 
expressed policy preferences (Boddery & Yates 2014). In the section that follows, we build on 
these insights to lay out an account that describes how the attribution of a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision on a case affects the public’s feelings about that decision. 
The Power of Attribution 
While opinion writing on the U.S. Supreme Court typically involves contributions and negotiations 
by other members of the Court, the majority opinion writer represents the agreed upon edict and 
rational of the collective. Thus, as one scholar observed, “even though a single [j]ustice signs the 
opinion by name, the text insists throughout on its shared provenance as the voice not just of its 
author but of all those who have voted to join it” (Ray 2000:518). Indeed, Justice Breyer faced a 
firestorm when he inadvertently used the pronoun “I” in a 1999 majority opinion (Mauro 1999; 
Ray 2000; Markham 2006; Bozzo 2015). 
The tradition of the U.S. Supreme Court issuing a single, signed opinion has been credited 
to Chief Justice John Marshall, who prevailed on the matter in a less famous disagreement with 
Thomas Jefferson, who favored the use of seriatim opinions (Ginsburg 1990:138). But even the 
Court itself does not always follow this American convention. The U.S. High Court regularly 
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issues unsigned “per curiam” opinions to convey its case decisions, and state high courts and the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals also follow this practice. While per curiam decrees are traditionally 
associated with routine, low-salience cases, critics of the practice point to numerous U.S. Supreme 
Court case opinions that have been delivered in this manner that addressed important policy and 
political issues (e.g., Bush v. Gore 2000). Most recently, in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, the 
eight-member Roberts Court handed down a per curiam, unanimous decision in a controversial 
case challenging the contraception mandate in President Obama’s Affordable Care Act (Zubik v. 
Burwell 2016). 
As U.S. Supreme Court scholars have documented, the choice of which justice will be 
assigned the majority opinion often reflects considerations about the symbolic value of particular 
justices and their ability to “help make policy more palatable to external actors, including the other 
political institutions and the public” (Epstein & Knight 1998:127). For instance, Chief Justice 
Harlan Stone assigned the majority opinion in Korematsu v. United States (1944) to Hugo Black, 
precisely because of his reputation as a civil libertarian (Epstein & Knight 1998:127). Similarly, 
in United States v. Virginia (1996), Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the majority opinion striking 
down Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admissions policy to Justice Ginsburg, as a nod to 
her expertise (Maltzman & Wahlbeck 1996) and lengthy experience litigating sex discrimination 
cases prior to becoming a federal judge. These examples suggest that members of the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognize the importance of opinion assignment and act strategically when selecting opinion 
 7 
authors because they believe it will have an impact on how the policy edict of the Court will be 
perceived.1 
Norms about how to attribute judicial decisions can vary a great deal across different court 
settings, but on the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority opinion author is identified in the case as 
delivering the “opinion of the Court.” This practice melds together both individual and institutional 
attributions to a decision, though of course, there are a number of exceptions to this practice 
throughout the Court’s history (see Markham 2006). However, the public generally learns of U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions not directly from Court opinions, but from media outlets (Davis 2014; 
Johnston & Bartels 2010), and the way that a ruling is framed has been shown to have an impact 
on citizen assessments of the Court and its decisions (Zilis 2015; Baird & Gangl 2006; Clawson 
& Waltenburg 2003). 2  Of course, media framing related to attribution of Court opinions is 
malleable; the media can make meaningful and consequential discretionary decisions on how it 
chooses to portray Court decisions.  Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately has the final 
say on how a decision is attributed.3 
                                    
1 Assignment decisions may also reflect a desire for particular expertise (e.g., Nash 2015), in 
addition to or instead of a concern for agreement. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising 
this point.  
2 A related body of literature examines the quality, tone, and substance of media coverage of the 
Supreme Court and the American judicial system (e.g., Slotnick & Segal 1998; Spill & Oxley 
2003). 
3 As we noted previously, the U.S. Supreme Court can choose to present opinions as a “united 
front” through the use of unsigned per curiam opinions. Indeed, Epstein et al. (2001) demonstrated 
 
 8 
But less is known about how specific attribution choices made by the U.S. Supreme Court 
affect public agreement with the Court’s decisions. One attribution approach is to characterize the 
decision as merely coming “from the Supreme Court” without providing additional context about 
which particular justice authored the opinion. By crediting the institution with the decision this 
approach would seem to garner greater acceptance of the decision by members of the public by 
connoting neutrality, credibility, clarity, legality, and even institutional legitimacy (Brigham 1987; 
Mondak 1992; Hoekstra 1995; Baird 2001; Bartels & Mutz 2009; Gibson et al. 2014). This general 
deference to and reverence of the U.S. High Court (and its actions) has been described as 
“positivity theory” (e.g., Gibson 2007).  In other words, by disentangling the identity of a policy 
edict from a specific justice (who may be associated with past voting choices or his or her 
nominating president) and attributing it to the nation’s highest legal institution—cloaked in the 
accouterments of stylized symbols of justice—a verdict that could otherwise appear politically 
driven is made more palatable, all else being equal. Certainly, the Court has used unattributed per 
                                    
that there have been important changes over time in how the Court chooses to conveys its opinions 
to the public. They employ the papers of Chief Justice Waite (2001:1874-88) to show that strong 
consensus on the Court during this period was not due to “easy cases”—the conference vote 
records demonstrate significant preliminary dissensus among the justices. During this period and 
well into the twentieth century the Court chose to mask these differences from the public in its 
conveyance of the formal opinion, ostensibly for institution enhancing reasons by delivering 
primarily unanimous (although signed) opinions (2001:364-65). The Court can and does utilize a 
similar tactic through the use of per curiam opinions today—it need only expand its existing 
practice to exert more control on how its decisions are portrayed by the media in the public realm. 
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curiam opinions to convey its judgments in particularly volatile cases dealing with politically 
charged issues involving freedom of the press (New York Times Co. v. United States 1971), capital 
punishment (Furman v. Georgia 1972) and national elections (Bush v. Gore 2000) among others.  
On the other hand, Nicholson and Hansford (2014) cast doubt on this view, as they find 
minimal evidence that attributing a decision as coming from the U.S. Supreme Court changes how 
heavily the public relies on partisan cues in its evaluations of a decision. While attributing the 
outcome of a case to the Court increased public acceptance of the decision in certain instances, the 
effect was quite small. Assaying a variety of heuristic cues concerning partisan attribution and 
other political considerations, they found that “public expectations for the Court and its decisions 
may be no different than expectations for the elected branches of government” (2014:15). 
Providing additional insight is the work of Zink et al. (2009) on the effect of majority coalition 
size on citizens’ willingness to agree with and find acceptable a U.S. Supreme Court decision. 
They found that when the justices are unanimous on a case ruling, the public is more likely to 
agree with the case and find it acceptable than when it is a split majority coalition—even when the 
Court’s decision is at odds with citizens’ ideological preferences. This suggests that outcomes that 
are perceived by the public as not turning on ideological or political lines (i.e., they are agreed to 
by all justices, regardless of well-known ideological divisions) are more apt to be found 
satisfactory. In contrast, other studies have found that unanimous votes do not have a positive 
effect on public views about U.S. Supreme Court decisions (Gibson et al. 2005), and that split 
decisions may even enhance public views of Court outcomes under certain conditions (Salamone 
2014).  These findings provide only indirect evidence for the premise that the Court as an 
institution can act as a heuristic cue because they focus on Court unanimity rather than attribution, 
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but they do prompt us to think about the impact of different ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
presents policy announcements to the public. 
 We endeavor to address a closely related concern inspired by the scholarly arguments of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, among others, regarding comparative approaches to how legal 
institutions convey legal policy decisions. As outlined earlier, nations’ methods for delivering high 
court outcomes differ in interesting ways and even within the U.S. Supreme Court we see the use 
of both signed and unsigned, per curiam legal opinions in cases of policy consequence. Our study 
focuses on how U.S. Supreme Court case outcomes are conveyed to the public—specifically 
whether the Court’s opinion is attributed to the majority opinion writing justice or to the Court as 
a whole. We theorize that when the identity of the legal decision is tied to the institution, rather 
than to an identifiable justice, citizens will be more likely to agree with the Court’s decision, all 
else being equal.  
The impact of this institutional cue is likely to vary in interesting ways, depending upon 
the characteristics of the respondent. More precisely, we posit that the positive relationship 
between attributing the case outcome to the U.S. Supreme Court (rather than a specific justice) and 
respondent favorability (i.e., agreement) described above will be conditioned on respondents’ 
more general orientations. First, we expect that this relationship will grow stronger as respondents’ 
ideology becomes more conservative. This possibility is consistent with studies suggesting an 
alignment between conservative values and generalized reverence toward authority, order, and 
governing institutions (e.g., Jost et al. 2003; Jost et al. 2007; Arceneaux & Nicholson 2012).4  
                                    
4 This relationship could emanate from more than one pathway for respondents. As noted, it could 
be steeped in conservative respondents’ orientation toward formal authority and authoritative 
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Second, this relationship between U.S. Supreme Court attribution and citizens’ agreement with 
Court outcomes should grow stronger as respondents’ general feelings regarding the legitimacy of 
the Court are more favorable—that is, as feelings of legitimacy toward an institution increase, such 
positivity is parlayed to appreciation of policy edicts that are attributed to the institution (e.g., 
Boddery & Yates 2014).5   
                                    
institutions such as the U.S. Supreme Court. Alternatively, it could be the situation that attribution 
of a case outcome that most would consider conservative (see discussion of vignette and 
experimental treatment in S2 and S3) to the Court generally (as opposed to a moderate Republican 
appointed justice) allows a conservative respondent to imagine that the “real” opinion author (or 
winning coalition) could be from one of the most conservative members of the Court. 
5 As noted above, our questionnaire poses a number of questions regarding respondents’ feelings 
regarding the legitimacy of the U.S. High Court. These questions are used to create an index of a 
respondent’s overall positive feelings regarding Court legitimacy. We acknowledge that the 
relationship dynamics between U.S. Supreme Court decisions and perceptions of Court legitimacy 
are complex. While we, along with a robust literature, are inclined to think that citizens’ 
perceptions of Court legitimacy are augmented (in relative terms) when they agree with a legal 
outcome from the institution (e.g. Gibson 2015), we also posit that a citizen holding strong 
generalized feelings that the Court is legitimate is more apt to agree with one of its legal decisions, 
all else being equal. Thus, there is the possibility of a circular relationship whereby citizens are 
more predisposed to agree with a Court they believe to be legitimate and, in turn, are also more 
inclined to have positive feelings regarding the legitimacy of the legal institution when they agree 
with its policy outcomes.		
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Finally, we anticipate that another source cue may affect the relationship between 
attribution and agreement: the gender of the opinion author.  As the number of women on the U.S. 
Supreme Court has increased, it is important to ascertain whether attributing a majority opinion to 
a female justice will impact agreement with the Court’s decision, relative to other attribution 
options.  
The literature on gender stereotypes and implicit bias suggests that male and female justices 
may not be evaluated similarly.  Due to stereotypes that link the law with masculine-associated 
traits (Pierce 1995), studies find that implicit bias appears to undermine assessments of the 
competence and qualifications of female judges (Gill et al. 2011; Sen 2014) and female attorneys 
(Brown & Campbell 1997; Bogoch 1997). Recent scholarship on the U.S. Supreme Court also 
shows that female justices tend to be interrupted more often than male justices by lawyers and their 
male colleagues, reflecting ingrained power dynamics (Jacobi & Schweers 2017; Patton & Smith 
2017).  More broadly, women are usually not associated with traits considered to be desirable for 
political leaders (Huddy & Terkildsen 1993), and at least one study has found that written work 
authored by women is viewed as less credible than work authored by men (Armstrong & McAdams 
2009). 
  On the other hand, there is some work that suggests that attributing a decision to a female 
justice might improve agreement or, at the very least, have a similar effect to a male-attributed 
opinion.  Normative arguments about descriptive representation on the U.S. Supreme Court often 
promote a link between the identity of justices and enhanced institutional legitimacy (Neff 1981; 
Myers 2009), and there is some evidence supporting the general argument with respect to minority 
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representation (Scherer & Curry 2010).6 That is, apart from the substance of the decision, an 
opinion attributed to a female justice could send the message that the U.S. Supreme Court reflects 
the diversity of American society, at least in terms of gender, and is thus more “fair” (National 
Women’s Law Center 2016).    
Alternatively, the public may be indifferent to the gender of the authoring justice when 
evaluating whether they agree with a decision. Schneider and Bos (2014) speculate that because 
the public has so little exposure to women in office, they cannot form clear, coherent judgments 
about their stereotypical qualities. If this is the case, it is not unreasonable to assume that the same 
dynamic could apply to assessments of female judges, given their underrepresentation in more 
prestigious and high-profile courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court.7  Taken as a whole, then, the 
literature does not provide us with clear expectations for how the public will respond to female-
attributed opinions relative to male-attributed or Court-attributed opinions.   
However, a number of studies on gender and political culture (Windett 2011; Hill 1981; 
Norrander & Wilcox 1998) suggest that the effect of gender attribution cues may vary in systematic 
ways, reflecting the prevailing cultural environments in which respondents live. Exposure theories 
argue that individuals’ exposure to experiences and socialization can lead to either more egalitarian 
views or more traditional views about gender, depending on the content of the experiences and the 
                                    
6 Indeed, President Obama took this view and stated his support for appointing a judiciary that 
“looks like America” (Goldman et al. 2013). 
7 While the numbers of women serving as judges in the United States has steadily increased since 
the 1970s, the occupation of judging is still heavily male-dominated as a whole and exhibits a 
strong, positive relationship with court prestige (Bratton & Spill 2002).  
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environment (Davis & Greenstein 2009).  These attitudes then translate into assessments of 
political elites. For instance, the traditionalistic political culture of the South (Key 1949; Elazar 
1974) has been linked with more traditional attitudes about gender roles (Powers et al. 2003) and 
poorer electoral prospects for women gubernatorial and legislative candidates (Windett 2011; 
Norrander & Wilcox 1998).  Beyond region, Moore and Vanneman (2003) find that living in a 
state with a higher proportion of religious fundamentalists is associated with holding more 
traditionalist attitudes toward gender.  Recently, a study using Windett’s (2011) measure of female 
socio-political culture (FSC) found that states with higher FSC scores are significantly more likely 
than low FSC states to elect female attorneys general and to have female candidates for this 
position in the party primary (Gordon 2016). 
Drawing from this work, we expect that respondents living in states with unfavorable 
political environments for women (Windett 2011) should be more apt to find the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision unfavorable if it is attributed to a female justice, and that the reverse should be 
true for respondents from states with more favorable political environments for women.  
Experimental Design 
To gauge whether opinion attribution affects the level of agreement a U.S. Supreme Court case 
disposition yields, we constructed a survey experiment in which we randomly populated three 
groups and presented respondents with one of three possible treatment vignettes that summarized 
the holding of an actual Court case. (See S1 in the Supplementary Materials for a randomization 
check and S3 for the vignettes’ language.)  Prior to the vignettes, respondents were given a pre-
test that asked basic demographic questions, as well as questions to assess their knowledge of and 
general feelings toward the U.S. Supreme Court. Following the treatment vignettes, a post-test 
asked respondents to rate their level of agreement with the Court’s decision on a six-point scale, 
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ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.8 
 Each vignette summarized the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 
District of Nevada (2004). Hiibel scored a two out of eight on Collins and Cooper’s (2012) 
expanded salience index because the case received news coverage in both the New York Times and 
Washington Post the day after the Court handed down the decision (see Greenhouse 2004; Lane 
2004).  Hiibel is a criminal procedure case; this issue area is particularly useful given our research 
question because it maps consistently onto a traditional left-right spectrum. Within this issue area, 
conservative case dispositions rule in favor of the government, supporting law and order concerns, 
and liberal case outcomes favor individual liberties. Arguments advanced in this issue area by the 
government often advocate its right to perform some kind of police or surveillance tactic, whereas 
individuals seek to prevent the government from using those procedures, typically invoking the 
protections of the Bill of Rights. 
 Hiibel involved Nevada’s “stop and identify” law. This statute requires individuals to 
identify themselves to a police officer if asked. Larry Hiibel was convicted under the Nevada 
statute for failing to identify himself to a police officer upon request and appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court claiming, among other things, that the law violated his Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that Nevada’s 
governmental interest in ensuring that its police force is capable of identifying, and potentially 
clearing, individuals of suspicion was a minor intrusion and was not barred by Hiibel’s protection 
                                    
8 In our study discussion we employ certain synonyms to denote agreement, including “favorable” 
and “palatable” to promote readability and to avoid repetitiveness. To clarify this matter up front, 
we are always referring to the same six-point scale of agreement degrees that we outline here. 
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against unreasonable searches. Because this case ruled in favor of the government’s advocated 
position, it is regarded as a conservative decision. The justices voting in Hiibel split along 
traditional ideological lines.9  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas 
joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined a dissent penned 
by Justice Breyer, and Justice Stevens wrote his own dissenting opinion. 
 The vignette read by Group 1 credited the case disposition simply to “the Supreme Court” 
and was accompanied by a photograph of the U.S. Supreme Court building’s exterior; such per 
curiam attribution should trigger the mechanisms posited by positivity theory—namely that the 
Court is uniquely suited to invoke deferential reactions because of its perception as a learned and 
hallowed institution (Gibson 2007).  In the two other treatment groups, respondents were informed 
that either a male or female justice authored the Court’s decision and were prompted with a 
corresponding picture 10  of the authoring justice as well as appropriate pronoun attribution. 
Specifically, respondents in Group 2 read a vignette that identified Justice Anthony Kennedy as 
                                    
9 In our vignettes, we chose to present the Court’s decision as split rather than unanimous or not 
mentioning the vote. We acknowledge that the literature on unanimity versus split vote (in relation 
to public views) is mixed (Gibson et al. 2005; Zink et al. 2009), but we wanted to mirror the actual 
vote in the case (which was split).  We also believe that presenting it as a split case gave 
respondents a more free choice to agree or disagree, since elite legal minds could differ on the 
outcome.  Lastly, we wanted to signal that the case was in no way a pro forma error correction of 
a lower court—rather, it was a contentious Court decision. 
10  We utilized the justices’ official color portraits from the U.S. Supreme Court’s website—
originally accessed in June 2015. They are shown here in black and white. 
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the author of the majority’s opinion, whereas Group 3’s vignette identified Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor as the majority opinion author.11  The substantive content of the Court’s holding was 
held constant among the treatment groups. Thus, the vignettes differed only with respect to the 
identity of the majority opinion author and the corresponding pronouns and photographs. 
Our study entails 1,287 respondents obtained via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
platform. AMT has proven to be a dependable data source for isolating treatment effects in 
experimental, decision-making settings and has been used in a wide variety of political science 
and policy contexts (e.g., Clifford et al. 2015; Bishin et al. 2015; Grimmer et al. 2012; Ryan 2012).  
We recognize that this platform is not without its limitations, however. AMT offers a 
nonprobability sample of opt-in respondents who tend to be younger, more liberal, and more 
educated than the general American public (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huber et al. 2012).  But compared 
to student convenience samples, AMT’s respondent pool is more representative (Paolacci et al. 
2010), and AMT respondents are also more engaged with survey-taking tasks compared to various 
other respondent pools (Weinberg et al. 2014).  In a comparison of AMT with American-based 
                                    
11 We selected Justices Kennedy and O’Connor for several reasons. First, Justice Kennedy did, in 
fact, author the majority opinion, and news agencies attributed the majority’s holding to him 
(Greenhouse 2004; Lane 2004).  Second, Justice O’Connor was the only female member of 
Hiibel’s majority bloc.  Third, and most importantly, widely used measures of justice ideology 
(e.g., Bailey 2007; Martin & Quinn 2002) place Justice O’Connor as ideologically proximate to 
Justice Kennedy. Justice O’Connor is ideologically the closest member on the Court to Kennedy 
(Martin & Quinn 2002). This relationship allows us to make Groups 2 and 3 as similar as possible 
in every aspect while varying only the photographs, justice names, and pronouns used. 
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population samples like the American National Election Survey (ANES), Levay et al. (2016) found 
that while differences between AMT respondents and ANES respondents did exist, these 
differences did not stem from immeasurable considerations. They concluded that differences 
between AMT respondents and population-based respondents could be identified and their effects 
largely ameliorated by accounting for a number of political and demographic controls.  
Importantly, a recent exhaustive study performed twenty survey experiments using AMT 
respondents while simultaneously performing the identical twenty experiments using a nationally 
representative sample, finding virtually indistinguishable results (Mullinix et al. 2015:122).  
Still, Mullinix et al. (2015) and others caution against considering convenience samples 
such as AMT as unqualified substitutes for population samples (e.g. Krupnikov & Levine 2014; 
Huff & Tingley 2015). In S1, we address these concerns by providing distribution information for 
our AMT sample on an array of relevant demographic and political variables. We find that our 
sample’s distribution largely mirrors the patterns in AMT samples identified by Levay, et al. 
(2016) and others (e.g. Berensky, et al. 2012). Similar to these studies, our AMT sample 
respondents are generally younger, lower earning, more liberal, and more likely to be white and 
male than those respondents typically found in population based samples.12  Accordingly, we 
follow the lead of Levay, et al. (2016) and include control variables to help address these 
differences in our regression models. We hasten to add that in our descriptive analyses (Figures 1 
and 2), these control variables are not employed, meaning that agreement levels displayed do not 
                                    
12	Just over 6 percent of our respondents identified themselves as black or mixed race (where black 
was one of the races chosen).  In the U.S. population, the Census Bureau estimates that about 12 
percent of the population is African American. 
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necessarily approximate population levels.  Rather, the focus for those analyses is on whether there 
are significant differences across treatment groups. 
Results 
Our survey respondents agreed with the case outcome in Hiibel more often than they disagreed—
with 62.2% of our sample favoring the case outcome and 37.8% not agreeing with it. We also find 
interesting variation among subcategories of agreement-disagreement. Of those who agreed with 
the decision, 11.5% of respondents strongly agreed, 28.3% agreed, and 22.5% slightly agreed. Of 
those who disagreed with the decision, 7.9% strongly disagreed, 12.4% disagreed, and 17.6% 
slightly disagreed. As depicted in Figure 1, we find support for our primary thesis. Case outcomes 
attributed to the U.S. Supreme Court rather than individual justices are more likely favored, and 
this holds for both difference of proportion (collapsed agree/disagree) and difference of means 
(degree of agreement/disagreement) analyses.  
Figure 1 about here 
  Given that the Hiibel case’s outcome is generally regarded as conservative, we are 
interested in how this consideration factors into our sample respondents’ propensity to agree with 
the decision. We find that 66% of self-identified conservatives agree with the holding, whereas 
just 61% of self-identified liberals agree with it. While this gap is not extremely large, we do find 
that there is a statistically significant difference between liberals and conservatives in both 
difference of proportions and difference of means tests.13 This prompts us to question whether 
                                    
13  The gap between self-identified liberal and conservative (collapsed measure) respondents in 
favoring the Hiibel decision is smaller than we anticipated. We believe that this may be due, in 
part, to the inherent bluntness of a one-dimensional (liberal-conservative) measurement for 
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ideological considerations may cast an influence upon our primary proposition regarding 
attribution’s effect on how legal outcomes are viewed. Figure 2 provides preliminary evidence that 
while a relationship exists between case outcome attribution (to the Court) and respondent 
agreement—both for self-identified liberals and conservatives—the relationship is stronger for 
conservatives. 
Figure 2 about here 
  We report ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for our analyses in Table 1. The 
first column of the table (Model 1) displays the results of a simple bivariate analysis of our primary 
thesis, which is supported. When the decision is attributed to justices rather than the U.S. Supreme 
Court—the excluded reference category—respondents are less likely to agree with the outcome. 
The results in the second column (Model 2) demonstrate that the relationship is robust to the 
introduction of relevant controls, including the respondent’s race, gender, ideology, knowledge of 
the Court, feelings regarding the Court’s overall legitimacy, age, income, and level of education.14  
(See S2 for variable descriptions.) 
                                    
ideology.  On the other hand, when we compare views of the law-and-order-oriented Hiibel 
outcome at the far ends of the self-identified spectrum (i.e., “extremely liberal” and “extremely 
conservative”) we see a more substantial gap. We find that only 48% of self-identified “extremely 
liberal” respondents agree with the decision, whereas 69% of those identifying as “extremely 
conservative” agree with it.  In our sample, a total of 158 respondents identified as “extremely 
liberal” and 32 identified as “extremely conservative.” 
14 Because the use of controls in experimental data is open to some debate (e.g., Mutz 2011), we 
include results for models both with and without control variables. Our control variables inevitably 
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Table 1 about here 
  In the multivariate model, we see that when the decision was attributed to a justice, this 
yielded a .348 point decrease in citizen agreement (again, on a 1-6 scale from “disagree strongly” 
to “agree strongly”) relative to the situation in which the decision was attributed to the Court as a 
whole.  We find that respondents’ race, education, income level, and knowledge of the U.S. 
Supreme Court have no statistically significant effect on agreement outcomes. On the other hand, 
women appear to find the decision in Hiibel moderately more palatable than men (a .195 point 
difference), and the results show that conservatism and positive views on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
legitimacy are also positively associated with agreement with the decision.  In contrast, relative 
                                    
tap into concerns that potentially hinge on both generalized feelings toward the Court as well as 
feelings toward a decision that favors law enforcement over civil liberties. Our ideology variable 
touches on both rationales: conservatives generally favor law and order and at the same time are 
more deferential toward formal authoritarian institutions, whereas liberals favor civil liberties and 
question institutional authority (e.g., Jost, et al. 2007). With respect to the demographic variables 
of race and sex, agreement with the Hiibel decision may turn on a combination of attitudes toward 
legal institutions (Gibson 2015), feelings on the importance of personal legal compliance and the 
rule of law (Cann & Yates 2016), as well as trust in enforcement entities and relative concern over 
the problem of crime and personal safety (University of Albany 2016). Our other control variables 
touch more on general feelings toward the U.S. Supreme Court as an institution. General feelings 
regarding U.S. Supreme Court legitimacy should make one more amenable to the Court’s verdicts; 
high knowledge of the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to also be associated with higher regard for 
the Court and its actions (Gibson 2015).  
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youth (i.e., under 35 years of age) was negatively associated with decision agreement. We also 
assessed the relationship using a logit model with a collapsed dependent variable in which ranges 
of disagreement are recoded as 0 and the levels of agreement as 1 (see Appendix, Table A1). Our 
findings using this approach largely mirror the results we obtained in our OLS estimation model 
and support our primary hypothesized relationship.15 
 We next revisit the interactive relationship regarding the potential conditioning effect of 
ideology on attribution of the decision to a justice versus the Court. The interaction results provided 
in our OLS analysis in Table 1 (Model 3) are depicted graphically in Figure 3 which displays the 
average marginal effects (Williams 2012) of our primary relationship between decision attribution 
and respondents’ degree of agreement with the case outcome—as conditioned on the respondent’s 
ideology (from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (6)). The negative relationship 
between justice attribution and agreement attains statistical significance with liberal respondents 
and grows stronger with increasing levels of self-identified conservatism. In supplemental models 
using logistic regression, our results are comparable (see the Appendix, table A1 and Figure A1). 
16  
Figure 3 about here 
                                    
15  Our primary findings are also confirmed by an ordered logit analysis (not shown) on 
respondents’ degree of agreement. 
16  In constructing, interpreting, and graphically presenting our interactive terms, we follow Ai & 
Norton (2003), Brambor et al. (2006), and Williams (2012). The interaction results are confirmed 
by auxiliary logit and ordered logit analyses in which our control variables (other than ideology) 
are not included. 
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These results confirm our expectation that respondents with conservative ideological 
leanings may be more sensitive to the heuristic cue of the nation’s highest legal authority, though 
with some caveats that we will discuss in our concluding remarks. Finally, our statistically 
significant findings regarding respondents’ feelings on the overall legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme 
Court prompt us to consider the possibility that such views may also act as a conditioning variable 
for the influence of case attribution. However, we find that the coefficients for the proposed 
interactive relationship do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in either the OLS 
(Table 1, Model 4) or the logit models (Table A1, Model 4). 
Source Cues and Opinion Author Gender 
Having found evidence that attribution of the majority opinion to a justice reduces agreement 
compared to Court-attributed opinions we next turn to the question of whether agreement is 
affected when the gender of the opinion author can be explicitly identified. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has grown from an all-male institution to one with multiple women on the bench, we know 
very little about what it means for an opinion to be attributed to a female justice versus a male 
justice. To the best of our knowledge, no systematic study to date has evaluated how opinion author 
gender affects agreement with decisions in issue areas that lack a salient gender dimension.17 As 
discussed earlier, criminal procedure cases provide a useful lens for assessing agreement with U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions because they are both common to the Court’s docket and salient to the 
general public. As the majority of U.S. Supreme Court decisions concern issue areas without an 
explicit gender dimension, the results of this analysis should allow us to identify any general 
                                    
17 Nelson (2015) examines how gender stereotypes affect assessments of U.S. Courts of Appeals 
judges in a gender salient issue area (sex discrimination cases). 
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advantage or disadvantage for case agreement that varies by the gender of the opinion author.18 
Moreover, the four women who have served as justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have been 
active in writing decisions about a wide range of issues. From 1981 to 2015, female justices penned 
a total of 548 majority opinions, with nearly one-third of those dealing with criminal procedure.19 
In this assessment we split our prior “Justice attributed” variable into female justice (denoting 
O’Connor) and male justice (denoting Kennedy) attributed variables, and once again, the reference 
is the Court-attributed treatment.  
  We also wish to assess whether sociopolitical context affects agreement with female-
attributed opinions. Accordingly, we utilize Windett’s (2011) dynamic measure of female 
sociopolitical culture (FSC), updated through 2012, which captures aspects of gendered political 
culture, general culture, and gendered social culture.20  In our study, high FSC states include 
                                    
18 See Childs & Krook (2006) for a discussion of the debate on how to conceptualize whether an 
issue is gender salient or not. 
19 These figures were drawn from the Spaeth Supreme Court Database and include only orally 
argued cases with a majority opinion. Of these, O’Connor wrote 289, Ginsburg 180, Sotomayor 
45, and Kagan 35. The justices penned between 25 and 30 percent of their opinions in criminal 
procedure cases.  
20 Specifically, the Windett measure is a composite of the following: the percentage of female 
elected officials (statewide, state senate, state house, Congress), Elazar’s political culture 
measures, women’s presence in the workforce, female college graduates, and ERA ratification. 
We also estimated our models using a measure of the “Best and Worst States for Women,” and the 
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Washington, Vermont, and Colorado while low FSC states include Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
and Louisiana.  The former group scores slightly higher in education, but both groups are similar 
with respect to age.  Where respondents live in environments where there are many well-educated, 
employed women, and women officeholders, this should condition them to hold more egalitarian 
attitudes about gender roles and thus assess female-attributed opinions more favorably than 
respondents in low FSC states. We first add the FSC score variable to our existing set of relevant 
controls (to ascertain its additive effect). We then include it in a set of interactive model 
specifications.  
Another relevant consideration for our investigation is whether male and female 
respondents will differ systematically in their assessment of female-attributed opinions, compared 
to male-attributed ones.  No studies of which we are aware have directly examined this question, 
but related research on legitimacy and fairness has produced mixed results (Bartels & Johnston 
2013; Cann & Yates 2008; Gibson & Nelson 2015). To unpack this in the context of our research 
question, we include a set of interactions by respondent gender in which we separately assay our 
tests regarding how female justices are perceived as opinion writers. 
Table 2 about here 
Differences in respondent agreement with Hiibel by gender are only slight. When the 
decision is attributed to a male justice (Kennedy) 58.16% of respondents agreed, compared to 
60.1% agreement when the female justice (O’Connor) was depicted as the opinion author. Moving 
                                    
results were substantively identical (Data and explanation of the alternative measure can be found 
here:  https://wallethub.com/edu/best-and-worst-states-for-women/10728/). 
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beyond these descriptive differences, in Table 2, we present the results of the OLS models21 
analyzing the impact of gender attribution on agreement with the Court’s decision, employing the 
set of controls discussed previously, along with FSC, and using Court-attributed opinions as the 
reference category.22  
The results (Model 1) indicate that both male (Justice Kennedy) and female (Justice 
O’Connor) attributed decisions fare worse than the Court attributed decision—as we might 
reasonably expect from our prior results. While the coefficient for Male justice is somewhat more 
negative than Female justice, relative to the Court attribution, the difference between the two was 
found to not be statistically significant in auxiliary analyses.23 Control variables largely mirror our 
prior findings; however, we do find that there is a negative and statistically significant association 
between FSC and respondent agreement.  
As discussed above, we have reason to believe that gender attribution dynamics could 
differ for respondents in states with lower levels of FSC, who should be less likely to agree with a 
                                    
21	Note that in the tables, the models employing the FSC measure in interactions have three fewer 
observations than all other models. This is due to the fact that our survey incorporated residents of 
Washington, D.C., whereas Washington, D.C. was not a part of Windett’s measure. 
22 Auxiliary analyses of models with no control variables confirm the findings in Table 2. 
23 In Table A3 of the Appendix we provide a head-to-head analysis of the female vs. male justice 
attribution in which the observations for the Court attribution are dropped from analysis and the 
female justice attribution is directly compared against the missing reference category of male 
justice attribution. We also include a similarly constructed model that addresses this matter in the 
context of the FSC interaction. 
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female-attributed opinion. The second column of Table 2 displays the interactive results regarding 
opinion attribution (female and male, relative to Court), conditioned upon FSC. In Figure 4, we 
depict the average marginal effects of the conditional relationship between Female justice and FSC 
on agreement. The interactive relationship indicates a positive relationship between female justice 
attribution and agreement as FSC increases to nearly one standard deviation above the mean. In 
sum, attributing a decision to a female justice in a higher FSC environment may augment public 
agreement with the decision relative to Court and male justice attribution—under limited 
conditions.   
Figure 4 about here 
We further investigate the effects of gender with regard to respondents in model 3. Our 
interactive term (Female justice X Female respondent) indicates no statistically significant 
relationship. However, the component terms of our interaction are also informative. When female 
justice is equal to zero, the statistical significance for Female respondent indicates that women 
respondents favor attributions to Male justice and Court attribution over Female justice attribution. 
The statistically significant component term Female justice indicates the effect of this variable 
(Female justice) when the respondent is male (i.e., Female respondent = 0). Here, we see that the 
coefficient for this component is negative and significant, suggesting that male respondents are 
less favorable to U.S. High Court decisions that are attributed to female justices.  
[Figure 5 here] 
Finally, we consider the respondent gender dynamic in the context of different 
sociopolitical environments by employing a triple interaction term: FSC X Female justice X 
Female respondent. Model 4 (Table 2) displays the results for this analysis, and the average 
marginal effects of the interactive relationship are depicted in more detail in Figure 5. As both 
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indicate, for female respondents there is no statistically significant interactive relationship between 
Female justice attribution and FSC. For male respondents, we see that while they are generally 
negatively inclined toward the female-authored decision, agreement levels become more positive 
as FSC rises, though this effect disappears at the highest levels of FSC. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that the manner in which a political institution conveys a policy 
decision to the public has an important influence on how citizens appraise the policy. More 
specifically, when a U.S. Supreme Court outcome is ascribed to the institution as a whole, rather 
than to a particular justice, people are more apt to agree with the policy decision. As a number of 
prior studies have demonstrated, the agreement dynamic that we uncover has important 
implications for public legitimacy—both for individual policy outcomes and for the institution 
more generally (e.g., Gibson 2012, 2015).  
 Our analysis also sheds light on debates over the relative suitability of the U.S. High 
Court’s (and lower courts’) present use of a “hybrid” approach for communicating policy decisions 
(i.e., generally attributing Court opinions of the majority coalition to a specific justice, while 
allowing other justices to write dissenting or concurring opinions at their discretion). Our findings 
suggest that this method of policy conveyance may work to undermine potential agreement with 
legal edicts, notwithstanding legal scholars’ arguments to the contrary (e.g., Robbins 2012). In 
contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of unsigned per curiam opinions may actually serve to help 
maintain the public’s “reservoir of good will” for both specific decisions and the Court more 
generally. This finding lends credence to calls by some legal academics to do away with 
individually signed opinions—which they believe lead to unhealthy “judicial individualism” and 
may ultimately be damaging to the U.S. Supreme Court’s standing (Lerner and Lund 2010). In 
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light of trends related to mass polarization and declining confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, it 
could be advantageous for the Court’s legitimacy to utilize more per curiam opinions in order to 
dampen ideological cues associated with particular justices.  It is conceivable that there may be an 
upper limit to the use of per curiam opinions—at least in relation to the degree to which they can 
be used to encourage public agreement. If so, the Court might strategically employ per curiam 
opinions only for its most salient and potentially politically volatile decisions. Of course, we 
recognize the importance of replicating our findings in other issue domains to understand more 
fully the impact on legitimacy.  
Furthermore, our findings run counter to prior studies showing that attribution of legal 
policy decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court have little influence on how the public assesses them 
(Nicholson and Hansford 2014). It remains to be seen whether our findings will apply in similar 
fashion to issue areas other than criminal procedure. However, given that this issue area occupies 
a significant portion of the Court’s docket (relative to any other single issue area), the phenomenon 
we have revealed involves a sizeable share of the U.S. Supreme Court’s policy output. It is also 
possible that such institutional cue-taking dynamics might not be applicable to lower federal or 
state courts in which the personalities and ideological proclivities of the judicial actors may not be 
as well-known as those of the justices of the U.S. High Court. Future research might explore this 
intriguing question as well as the possibility that similar institution-oriented heuristics might affect 
public views on the policy edicts of other branches of government.  
 Our paper also breaks new ground in identifying the role that gender plays in how the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s policy decisions are interpreted by the public. In the overall analysis, we find 
that attributing a decision to the institution is associated with more agreement than attributing it to 
either a male or a female justice. However, the social, political, and economic environment for 
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women in a state also affects how citizens assess gender cues in the attribution of a decision. In 
states where female candidates face better odds in winning elections, respondents afford more 
deference to female-attributed opinions relative to Court-attributed decisions, preferring both over 
those attributed to a male author. But in states with low levels of female sociopolitical culture, 
female-attributed opinions are viewed less favorably relative to those attributed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Our findings regarding female sociopolitical context appear to be driven primarily 
by male respondents; they are most affected by their environment, at least in this regard. 
To the best of our knowledge, no existing study has uncovered a gender effect for 
authorship of U.S. Supreme Court decisions before, and it has important implications for the 
efficacy of the Court in garnering agreement with its policy pronouncements.  While this provides 
some support for the perspective that having a U.S. Supreme Court that “looks like America” may 
improve public perceptions of the Court’s decisions, it is clear that this legitimizing effect is not 
uniform.  From the Court’s perspective, our findings suggest that it may be advantageous to utilize 
per curiam decisions more often, so as to mitigate differences in public reactions to the gender of 
the opinion author. 
The effects isolated in this study are noteworthy but, like all experimental effects, call for 
replication.  Future research should explore whether opinion attribution effects also appear in more 
gender-salient issue areas, such as reproductive rights and employment discrimination.  
Furthermore, it may be advantageous to see if our findings persist for U.S. Supreme Court policy 
outcomes that are traditionally thought of as liberal in orientation. In the context of our 
conservative policy vignette, we find that that the Court attribution effect is stronger as respondent 
ideology grows more conservative. It remains to be seen whether this same conditioning effect 
(presumably based on conservative deference to authoritarian institutions) holds true for 
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conservatives’ favorability toward liberal U.S. Supreme Court outcomes or, conversely, if there is 
a mirrored effect for more liberal respondents (suggesting an alternative path of such conditioned 
influence).24 Finally, our primary finding regarding gender and political environment is driven to 
some degree by male respondents. This finding may be a product of the issue area (criminal 
procedure) that we utilize or may be a more general phenomenon. Either possibility is intriguing 
and prompts us to consider the contextual nature of citizen contemplation of U.S. Supreme Court 
verdicts. Along these lines, additional research should explore the negative relationship between 
female sociopolitical culture and agreement, even after controlling for ideology.  This too could 
be a function of the criminal context of our experiment, though we cannot say for certain. 
Although AMT samples have consistently been shown to mirror results from studies based on 
probability samples (Mullinix et al. 2015), future studies should also survey a representative 
sample of individuals in real time, as the U.S. Supreme Court releases its written opinions.  Lastly, 
a natural extension of this study could employ content analysis to examine how media reports treat 
per curiam opinions compared to attributed opinions handed down by the Court.  Given the recent 
spotlight political actors displeased with certain legal holdings have placed on individual U.S. 
federal judges (Liptak 2016; Wang 2017), employing per curiam opinions to a greater extent is a 
reasonable and straightforward way judges may avoid individualized scrutiny while 
simultaneously protecting the public support that is so crucial to a judiciary’s longevity. 
                                    
24 As noted previously, attribution of a conservative case outcome to the entire Court (as opposed 
to an ideological swing justice such as Kennedy or O’Connor) may allow a more conservative 
respondent to conceive that the actual opinion author (or, alternatively, the winning coalition) is 
one of the Court’s most conservative justices (e.g. Scalia or Thomas). 
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Table 1: OLS Estimates for Degree of Agreement/Disagreement with Supreme Court Decision 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Justice attributed decision -0.348** -0.336** 0.019 -0.339** 
 (0.0847) (0.0794) (0.2067) (0.0852) 
Conservatism — 0.151** 0.234** 0.151** 
  (0.0312) (0.0550) (0.0312) 
Court legitimacy — 0.098** 0.098** 0.097** 
  (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0167) 
Female respondent — 0.195* 0.193* 0.195* 
  (0.0796) (0.0796) (0.0797) 
Knowledge — -0.272 -0.265 -0.272 
  (0.1495) (0.1495) (0.1497) 
White — 0.109 0.109 0.109 
  (0.0924) (0.0923) (0.0925) 
Age under 35 — -0.256** -0.258** -0.256** 
  (0.0828) (0.0827) (0.0830) 
Income over $50K — 0.0434 0.0427 0.0435 
  (0.0781) (0.0780) (0.0782) 
College graduate — 0.0650 0.0621 0.0649 
  (0.0780) (0.0779) (0.0780) 
Justice attributed decision X 
conservatism 
— — -0.126 
(0.0673) 
— 
Justice attributed decision X 
legitimacy 
— — — 0.002 
(0.0208) 
     
Constant 4.085** 3.622** 3.391** 3.623** 
 (0.0687) (0.1833) (0.2197) (0.1839) 
     
Observations 1287 1287 1287 1287 
F 16.91** 20.99** 19.16** 18.97** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.125 0.127 0.125 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 2: OLS Estimates for Agreement with Supreme Court Decision, including Justice Gender 
and Interaction with Respondents’ Female Sociopolitical Culture (FSC) 
 
Variables OLS  
Model 1 
OLS  
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
OLS 
Model 4 
     
Female justice -0.2652** -0.4588** -0.2646* -0.5959**  
 (0.0925) (0.1352) (0.1143) (0.1713) 
Male justice -0.3881** -0.3857** -0.3881* -0.3890** 
 (0.0912) (0.0912) (0.0912) (0.0916) 
 Conservatism 0.1446** 0.1446** 0.1446** 0.1431** 
 (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0322) 
Court legitimacy 0.0986** 0.0980** 0.0986** 0.0964** 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0100) 
Female respondent 0.1902* 0.1934* 0.1906* 0.2581 
 (0.0784) (0.0784) (0.0932) (0.1415) 
Knowledge -0.2757 -0.2771 -0.2757 -0.2617 
 (0.1489) (0.1488) (0.1489) (0.1490) 
White 0.0919 0.0869 0.0920 0.0956 
 (0.0914) (0.0913) (0.0914) (0.0918) 
Age under 35 -0.2618** -0.2632** -0.2619** -0.2663** 
 (0.0829) (0.0828) (0.0831) (0.0827) 
Income over $50K 0.0557 0.0499 0.0557 0.0434 
 (0.0766) (0.0765) (0.0767) (0.0765) 
College Graduate 0.0807 0.0808 0.0808 0.0802 
 (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0765) (0. 0763) 
Female Sociopolitical Culture 
(FSC) 
-0.2144** 
(0.0591) 
-0.2868** 
(0.0696) 
-0.2144** 
(0.0590) 
-0.2490* 
(0.0990) 
FSC X Female Justice — 0.2369 
(0.1273) 
— 0.3893* 
(0.1643) 
Female Justice X Female 
Respondent 
— — -0.0015 
(0.1653) 
0.2993 
(0.2630) 
Female Respondent X FSC — — — -0.0839 
(0.1381) 
FSC X Female Justice X 
Female Respondent 
— — — -0.3584 
(0.2629) 
Constant 3.8149** 3.8802** 3.8148** 3.8500** 
 (0.1932) (0.1928) (0.1942) (0.2038) 
     
Observations 1284 1284 1284 1284 
 F 19.79** 18.72** 18.13 15.35** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133 0.134 0.132 0.145 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (two-tailed tests) 
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Figure 1: Agreement with Court’s Decision, by Attribution 
 
 
 
Note: Entries in the top graph (Mean Agreement With Decision) are mean agreement scores based 
on a 1-6 scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = 
agree, and 6 = strongly agree). Analysis of variance produced a statistically significant effect (F = 
16.84, p < .01) with one-tailed tests. Entries in the bottom graph (Proportion Agree With Decision) 
are proportions based on a collapsed measure of the agreement scores (0 = disagree, 1 = agree). 
Difference of proportion analysis produced a statistically significant effect (Z = 3.24, p<.01) with 
one-tailed tests. For both analyses, N = 1287.  The dashed line allows for easier comparison of the 
effect size across attribution conditions.    
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Figure 2: Agreement with Court’s Decision, by Attribution and Respondent Ideology 
 
 
 
 
Note: Entries in the top graph (Mean Agreement With Decision) are mean agreement scores based 
on a 1-6 scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = 
agree, and 6 = strongly agree). Analysis of variance produced a statistically significant effect for 
Conservative respondents (F = 18.56, p < .01) and for Liberal respondents (F = 5.23, p < .01) with 
one-tailed tests. Entries in the bottom graph (Proportion Agree With Decision) are proportions 
based on a collapsed measure of the agreement scores (0 = disagree, 1 = agree). Difference of 
proportion analysis produced a statistically significant effect for Conservative respondents (Z = 
3.58, p<.01) and for Liberal respondents (Z = 1.70, p<.05) with one-tailed tests. For all analyses, 
N = 1287.  The dashed line allows for easier comparison of the effect size across attribution 
conditions.   
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Figure 3: The Average Marginal Effects of an Opinion Attributed to a Justice rather than the 
Court on Case-Specific Agreement as Political Ideology Ranges from Liberal to 
Conservative 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure demonstrates an interactive relationship in the linear regression model by 
plotting the average marginal effect of a justice attributed opinion on the dependent variable, case-
level agreement (Hiibel), as political ideology ranges from liberal to conservative.  
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Figure 4: The Effect of a Female Opinion Author on Case-Specific Agreement as Female 
Sociopolitical Culture Varies 
 
 
 
 
Note:  This figure demonstrates an interactive relationship by plotting the average marginal effects 
of a female opinion author on the dependent variable, case-level agreement (Hiibel), as female 
sociopolitical culture varies.  
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Figure 5: The Effect of a Female Opinion Author on Case-Specific Agreement as Female 
Sociopolitical Culture Varies among Male and Female Respondents 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure demonstrates a triple interactive relationship by plotting the average marginal 
effects of a female opinion author the dependent variable, case-level agreement, as female 
sociopolitical culture varies among male and female respondents. 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
S1: Randomization Check 
 
Variable Group 1  The Court 
Group 2 
Justice Kennedy 
Group 3 
Justice O’Connor 
Female 37% 33% 31% 
White 34% 34% 32% 
Conservative 32% 35% 33% 
College graduate 34% 36% 30% 
Age under 35 33% 33% 34% 
 Income over $50K 34% 30% 36% 
N  (%) 436 (34%) 435 (34%) 416 (32%) 
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S2: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Description Range Mean S.D. 
Level of agreement 
1 = ‘disagree strongly’; 2 = ‘disagree’; 3 = 
‘slightly disagree’; 4 = ‘slightly agree’; 5 = 
‘agree’; and 6 = ‘strongly agree’ with the Court’s 
decision 
1 to 6 3.854 1.448 
Agreement 
1 = respondent agrees with the Court’s decision 
(i.e. collapsed ‘strongly agree,’ ‘agree,’ and 
‘slightly agree’; 0 = respondent disagrees (i.e. 
collapsed ‘strongly disagree,’ ‘disagree,’ and 
‘slightly disagree’) 
0 to 1 .622 .484 
Court attributed 
opinion 
1 = vignette in which the case decision is 
attributed to Supreme Court generally; 0 = 
otherwise (see vignettes question wording in S3) 
0 to 1 .338 .473 
Female justice 
1 = vignette in which the case decision is 
attributed to justice Sandra Day O’Connor; 0 = 
otherwise (see vignettes question wording in S3) 
0 to 1 .323 .476 
Male justice 
1 = vignette in which the case decision is 
attributed to justice Anthony Kennedy; 0 = 
otherwise (see vignettes question wording in S3) 
0 to 1 .337 .473 
Conservatism 
 
Respondents’ self-identified ideological status – 
1=extremely liberal; 2=liberal; 3=slightly liberal; 
4=slightly conservative; 5=conservative; and 
6=extremely conservative 
1 to 6 2.852 1.232 
Court legitimacy 
Index of respondents’ general diffuse support for 
the U.S. Supreme Court via questions on feelings 
regarding the Court—positive scores reflect 
higher support. These questions are randomly 
ordered or toggled in the survey with the vignettes 
and related questions. (See questions in S3) 
-10 to 10 1.113 4.121 
Female respondent 1= female respondent; 0=male 0 to 1 .401 .490 
White 1= white respondent; 0=otherwise 0 to 1 .783 .411 
Knowledge 
Respondents’ level of knowledge of U.S. Supreme 
Court via score on series of questions regarding 
the Court (proportion of answers correct) (see 
questions in S3) 
0 to 1 .477 .259 
Age under 35 1= respondent under 35 years of age; 0=otherwise 0 to 1 .664 .472 
Income over $50K 1=respondent income over $50,000/year; 0=otherwise 
0 to 1 .455 .498 
College graduate 1= respondent is college graduate; 0=otherwise 0 to 1 .485 .500 
Female 
Sociopolitical 
Culture 
Windett’s (2011) dynamic measure of female 
sociopolitical culture, updated through 2012 
-.73 to 
2.21 
.815 .613 
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S3: Treatment Vignettes and Supreme Court Questions 
 
Case Vignettes: The underlined text below changed depending on group assignment. One third of 
the respondents received the control script along with a color picture of the Supreme Court building. 
One third of the respondents received a treatment script that identified Justice Kennedy as the 
majority opinion writer accompanied by his color photo (Male Author Treatment). One third of the 
respondents received a treatment script that identified Justice O’Connor as the majority opinion 
writer accompanied by her color photo (Female Author Treatment). The textual differences among 
the groups are italicized. 
 
 
Court Attributed Opinion: 
In a split opinion in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state 
law that made it a crime solely for refusing to disclose one’s 
name to authorities during a police investigatory stop. In its 
opinion, the Court said that giving one’s name is only a modest 
intrusion on that person’s privacy and also does not violate the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. 
 
 
 
Male Author Treatment: 
In a split opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2004, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld a state law that made it a crime solely for refusing to 
disclose one’s name to authorities during a police investigatory stop. In his 
opinion, Justice Kennedy said that giving one’s name is only a modest 
intrusion on that person’s privacy and also does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination. 
 
 
 
 
Female Author Treatment:  
In a split opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2004, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state law that made it a crime solely for 
refusing to disclose one’s name to authorities during a police investigatory 
stop. In her opinion, Justice O’Connor said that giving one’s name is only 
a modest intrusion on that person’s privacy and also does not violate the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. 
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Supreme Court Knowledge Questions: Respondents read the following questions, and their 
responses were used to measure levels of Court knowledge (proportion correct). 
 
• Who is the current Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court? 
- Anthony Kennedy 
- Antonin Scalia 
- Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
- John Roberts 
- Samuel Alito 
• Can U.S. Supreme Court justices be impeached? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Do not know 
• Must the U.S. Supreme Court decide every case that is appealed to it? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Do not know 
• Do all nine justices need to be present in order for the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a case? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Do not know 
• Of the choices given below, which justice is currently serving on the U.S. Supreme Court? 
- Sandra Day O’Connor 
- William Rehnquist 
- Stephen Breyer 
- David Souter 
- John Paul Stevens 
 
Supreme Court Legitimacy Questions: After each of the following questions, respondents were 
asked to rate on a five-option scale how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements. We 
used their responses to create an additive measure for Supreme Court legitimacy.  
 
• If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, 
it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether. 
• The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. 
• The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others. 
• The U.S. Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the 
country as a whole. 
• The U.S. Supreme Court can be trusted to operate in the best interest of the American 
people.  
